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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers developments which have necessitated greater involvement and a greater role  
for the central bank in financial regulation and supervision. The aftermath of the 2007/08 Financial  
Crisis has witnessed the enactment of legislation such as the Banking Act of 2009 which has not  
only  introduced greater  statutory powers  for  the central  bank,  but  also the Special  Resolution  
Regime. As well as a consideration of arguments which are in favour of the central bank’s role as  
supervisor and lender of last resort, the importance of central bank independence and safeguards 
which exist to ensure that sufficient accountability is fostered, will be considered. Safeguards and 
accountability mechanisms which are adequate, such that, whilst ensuring that the regulator is not  
susceptible to regulatory capture, do not impede the ability of such a regulator to obtain vital and  
necessary information from systemically important individual financial institutions. In its support of  
the view that central banks should assume a greater role in supervision, this paper not only seeks to  
justify  why such a  degree  of  involvement  is  vital  to  ensuring  and maintaining  stability  in  the  
financial system, but also those factors which are considered to be necessary if such a role is to be  
effective. 
Key Words: lender of last resort, special resolution regime, Financial Crisis, liquidation, bankruptcy, 
systemic risks, living wills, bailing in, resolution procedures, deposit protection, liquidity
Central Bank’s Role and Involvement in Bank Regulation: Lender of Last 
Resort Arrangements and the Special Resolution Regime (SRR) 
Marianne Ojo1
Introduction 
In considering the importance of the central  bank’s independence in prudential  supervision and 
whether such importance necessitates the adoption of legal provisions which would ensure such 
independence,  this  paper  will  commence  with  a  brief  overview  of  developments  which  have 
highlighted the growing importance of liquidity. Section B will then consider resolution regimes, as 
well as existing central bank arrangements in selected jurisdictions and the central bank’s role in 
maintaining  stability within the financial  system. The next  section  will  focus  on developments 
which have lead to the introduction of the Special Resolution Regime in some jurisdictions whilst 
other jurisdictions are still deliberating on the matter. Central bank independence, with particular 
focus on central bank financial and operational independence, will then be elaborated on under 
scetion  D.  This  section  will  also  consider  arguments  in  favour  of  and  against  central  bank 
independence.  The  concluding  sections  comprise  of  discussions  on  measures  which  have  been 
introduced in the aftermath of the recent Financial Crises and why such measures will serve as 
suitable and necessary complements to previous and present measures aimed at safeguarding central 
bank independence. In concluding this paper, one of its aims is to highlight the conflicts which exist 
between the central bank’s independence and the goal of maintaining and achieving stability within 
the financial system– particularly where adequate safeguards are not in place. 
A. Ever Increasing Importance of Liquidity and the Role of the Central Bank as Lender 
of Last Resort
 
From the  events  witnessed  during  the  2007/2008 Financial  Crisis,  the  increased  importance  of 
liquidity, maturity mismatches, and the degree of interconnection between banks, are factors which 
make the central bank’s role as a lender of last resort even more important. The ease with which an 
asset could be traded was also a prominent feature of the Crisis.2 Even though it has been argued 
that  investment  banks  are  not  systemically  important,3 any  bank  which  has  a  high  degree  of 
“interconnection” with other banks should be considered systemically important. 
Perhaps it is because of such a perception – that investment banks are not really that systemically 
important, that the collapse of Bear Stearns came as a bit of surprise and was at the same time, quite 
an ironical event. Ironical4 in the sense that whilst the US could be argued to be well equipped in its 
1 Contact Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2  See C Reinhart and A Felton, ‘The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century: Part II, June – December 2008 
<  http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13604>  at  page  5.  For  further  information  on  how a  problem in  sub  prime 
mortgages,  estimated to be less than 1% of the world’s debt  stock triggered a series of failures throughout the 
financial system, see ibid. 
3  “In the sense that no investment bank performs tasks that cannot be performed readily and with comparable 
effectiveness by other institutions” see W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises at page 99. 
4 This view is also expressed by Raghallaigh and Kennedy who highlight how the US, in the 1930s, was able to 
confront the Financial Crisis at the time, through the vehicle of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
regulation  and  supervision  of  deposit  taking  institutions,  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation's ambit at the time of Bear Stearn's collapse, did not extend to investment banks.
As the fifth largest investment bank in the US, Bear Stearns played a significant role in the credit 
default swaps market, acted as prime broker to many hedge funds and was not only a primary dealer 
in the bond market, but also a counter party to many prominent Wall Street firms.5 In the words of 
one  Fed official,  “  Bear  Stearns  was  too  interconnected  to  be  allowed to  fail  at  a  time when 
financial markets are extremely fragile”.6 
Central banks’ roles as lenders of last resort arrangements and their oversight of systemically vital 
financial institutions is becoming increasingly acknowledged as a reason for an extension of their 
involvement in regulation and supervision of the financial system. Some reasons attributed to the 
central bank’s ability to play such a vital role in supervision relate to:7 Its ability to provide liquidity 
privately – by virtue of the vast amounts of liquid assets in its reserves; its ability to maintain 
sufficient liquidity - such that it can manage its business when markets operate at normal levels of 
liquidity. It also has access to sufficient liquidity through credit lines and swaps, for example. 
Maintaining the close involvement of national  central  banks in prudential  supervision has been 
highlighted by the European Central Bank (ECB) as a vital pre requisite, not only in facilitating the 
Euro system’s adequate contribution to monitoring risks to financial stability in the Euro zone, but 
also in ensuring smooth coordination between central bank functions which are carried out at supra 
national level and supervisory functions carried out at national level.8 It  has been observed that 
since the start of the Crisis, the ECB has complained of a lack of information on banks which have 
the potential to trigger systemic failures.9 Further, the existence of legal impediments to the sharing 
of information between national regulators in the Euro zone and the ECB has been noted.10 
An approach whereby a European system of supervisory agencies consisting of national prudential 
agencies which would be aggregated within a single supervisory system with cross border structures 
–  similar  to  the  European System of  Central  Banks,  has  been  proposed.11 Further,  a  European 
prudential supervisory agency would not only be responsible for strategic supervisory decisions, but 
The FDIC, in their opinion, served as a „backstop in relation to deposit taking banks. Furthermore, the Corporation 
is not simply a  deposit protection scheme, as suggested by its name, but also critically what is called a resolution 
agency.“ See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at 
page 1. Having been able to confront the Crisis of the 1930s, the fact that Lehman Brothers and other Wall Street 
banks (as investment banks) were „beyond the FDIC oversight writ and conservatorship – a matter which has since 
changed as a result of the Dodd Frank Act“, is considered to have generated such irony.
5  See K Guha ‚ Fed Moves To Minimise Systemic Risk’ The Financial Times March 14 2008.
6  ibid
7   See W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System”, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on August 21-
23, 2008) at page 31.  
8   LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 
4, July 2008, p 454.  
9  W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System”, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on August 21-
23, 2008) at page 113. 
10  ibid
11  See J Lawson and S Barnes  and Marte Sollie  ‘Financial  Market  Stability in the European Union:  Enhancing 
Regulation and Supervision’ Economics Department Working Paper No. 670 page 37 and also D Schoenmaker and 
S Oosterloo, “Financial Supervision in Europe: A Proposal for a New Architecture”, in: L. Jonung, C. Walkner and 
M. Watson (eds),  Building the Financial Foundations of the Euro - Experiences and Challenges, 2008 Routledge, 
London. <http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2009doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00000C9A/$FILE/JT03259984.PDF>  
also the design of policies.12 It would also assist in the resolution of disputes between home and 
country supervisors.13
The task of harmonisation in the area of bank regulation and supervision in the Euro zone however, 
appears to be a daunting one. Given the diverse structures of regulation across Euro member states, 
it  is  not  so  difficult  to  understand  why  the  ECB  has  no  formal  supervisory  role.14 The 
recommendations of the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, which 
are aimed at re building the structure of financial regulation and supervision in the EU, consist of 
three new elements.15 
According to Raghallaigh and Kennedy, two significant roles are attributed to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance  Corporate,  pursuant  to  the  1989  Financial  Institutions  Reform,  Recovery  and 
Enforcement  Act  (FIRREA)  and  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act 
(FDICIA).16
The first being to act as an insurer of bank depositors/savers. The amount of the cover is capped and 
it expressly operates as an insurance scheme (unlike the EU guarantee regimes). 
The second role being in the capacity of statutory receiver (resolution authority) for failed or failing 
participating (i.e. insured) banking institutions – such a role conferring it  with „wide powers and 
discretion ranging from disposal of the entity taken into receivership, through to winding up and 
liquidation, while also ensuring prompt payout on insured deposits in the latter case.“ 
Furthermore they add that „the FDIC in these roles is also situated in a wider setting, the prudential 
supervision and regulation of banking generally, including (Prompt Corrective Action) PCA, by the 
authorities including the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB or the Fed) and US Treasury and now with the 
enactment of Dodd Frank, the Federal Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).“17
Financial crises such as those of Northern Rock, IKB and Hypo Real Estates in Europe, have lead to 
a review of arrangements involving the central banks in the jurisdictions concerned. The occurrence 
of these crises also highlighted the need for a special resolution regime and a “bridge bank” whose 
aims are to address the needs of failing banks.  
12  ibid
13  ibid
14  See W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises at page 113.
15  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22; Also see De Larosière, 2009, “Report of the High-level Group on 
Financial Supervision in the EU,” Brussels, Feb 25, 2009. These elements comprise of a macro prudential authority 
(ESRC),  a  micro  prudential  authority (ESFS) and a  consolidation of  sectoral  committees  such  as  those of  the 
CEBS,CEIOPS and CESR which elevates their status to that of “authorities” which are conferred specific powers 
aimed at guaranteeing consistent supervision across the EU.  
16  See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at page 35.
17 See ibid; for further reading also refer to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties: Lessons  
for  the  Future,  FDIC,  (1997)  Washington  DC,  http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/ and  Federal  Deposit 
Insurance Corporation ,  Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and the RTC Experience, FDIC,(1998) Washington DC 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/contents.pdf
B. Resolution Regimes and Existing  Supervisory Arrangements in Different Jurisdictions
Resolution Regimes
„The terms “resolution” and “resolution regime” are understood as referring to any action by a 
national  authority,  with  or  without  private  sector  involvement,  intended  to  maintain  financial 
stability and/or address serious problems in a financial institution that imperil its viability (eg a 
substantive condition of authorisation) where, absent resolution, the institution is no longer viable 
and there is no reasonable prospect of it becoming so.“18
Three types of resolution regimes as identified,19   are as follows:
Special resolution regimes : 
− These enable authorities to take control of banks and other financial group companies before 
or upon insolvency and that  provide a  wider range of resolution or stabilisation powers 
thereafter.  Full-blown special  resolution  regimes  are  mainly administrative  regimes,  and 
they provide directed transfer powers. This includes an ability to effect partial transfers of 
the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  financial  institution  to  third  party  purchasers  or  bridge 
institutions,  without  needing  to  obtain  the  consent  of  shareholders,  creditors  and 
counterparties of the failed institution.
Special administration or management regimes20
Mixed regimes21
Existing Arrangements in Germany and the UK 
In contrast  to the UK where the Bank of England is  not  really involved in  the supervision of 
financial institutions, the German Central Bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, not only assists BaFin 
in exercising supervision over credit  and financial  institutions, but is also in charge of ongoing 
monitoring  of  credit  institutions.  Parliament  had  good  reasons  for  involving  the  Bundesbank 
through section  7 of  the  Banking Act  in  the  banking  supervision  process.22The Bundesbank is 
18  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress So Far, July 2011, BIS 
Publications at page 7.
19 See ibid at page 8.
20  „which are hybrid administrative/judicial regimes in which the banking supervisors or resolution authorities appoint 
special  officials (variously referred to as special  administrators,  provisional  administrators,  special  managers or 
statutory managers) to implement resolutions. They are designed to facilitate a (going concern) restructuring and/or 
recapitalisation  of  the  failing  institution.  Should  a  restructuring  not  be  possible  under  these  regimes,  a  forced 
liquidation or bankruptcy-type process generally applies. „ see ibid
21  which are „without the full range of powers exhibited by the first two groups, in some cases because the powers can 
only be exercised with the consent or on a majority vote of shareholders and/or creditors, and in some cases because 
the regime strongly relies on court-administered proceedings, in particular in the insolvency liquidation phase. These 
arrangements nevertheless are generally distinct from corporate insolvency procedures.“ ibid
22  Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision’ Monthly Report (September 
involved in basically all aspects of banking supervision and these include:23 The issuing of general 
rules such as principles and regulations; undertaking regular surveillance which excludes sovereign 
and isolated  measures  directed  at  institutions  – as  these are  reserved for  the  Federal  Financial 
Supervisory  Authority;  banking  supervisory  audits;  ongoing  monitoring  of  institutions;24 
international  cooperation  in  coordination  of  prudential  matters  and  crisis  management  roles. 
Regulators  with  combined  regulatory  and  supervisory  roles  such  as  the  Federal  Reserve,  or 
supervisory systems where the central bank and regulator are closely involved in supervision, such 
as that which exists in Germany, are advantageous in that such regulators possess more accurate, 
complete and timely information about systemically important institutions than those jurisdictions 
where the central bank has less involvement in regulation. 
II. The Central Bank’s Role in Maintaining Stability. 
Central bank independence has been the preferred means to facilitating monetary stability since the 
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and factors contributing to this include: Fact that in 
the EU, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union made legal central bank independence a conditio  
sine qua non  to participating in European Monetary Union. This is in addition to the other four 
criteria of economic convergence and the additional requirements regarding fiscal responsibility. 
The second factor emanates from the skills, expertise and superior qualifications of central bankers 
when compared to those of politicians.25 The separation or combination of the roles of the central 
bank as lender of last resort and supervisor constitutes a controversial topic. It is argued that whilst 
a supervisory authority like the Fed Reserve has greater likelihood to possess “institution specific 
information”  which  is  vital  for  performing  the  LLR  role  effectively,  it  is  also  susceptible  to 
regulatory capture.26 Furthermore,  supervisory authorities  such as the Bank of England and the 
European Central Bank are considered to be less vulnerable to the possibility of being captured, but 
not so well informed about impending liquidity or solvency problems in systemically prone and 
important financial institutions.27 
In addition to its monetary policy setting functions, there are many reasons in favour of the central 
bank also acting as supervisor28 and these are as follows: That the central bank must have concern 
for the efficient working of the payments system and that as a result, it should also supervise and 
regulate at  least  the main money-market commercial banks at  the heart of the system; that any 
rescue or liquidity crises will usually require quick injection of cash-which can only be done by the 
central bank. For this reason, it is argued that the central bank and supervisory body work closely 
together and that this can best be achieved through internalising the supervisory body within the 
2000) p 34.
23  ibid
24  This involves the evaluation of documents submitted by institutions; auditors' reports pursuant to section 26 KWG, 
annual financial statements, as well as performing and evaluating audits of banking operations in order to assess the 
adequacy of institutions' capital and risk management procedures and the appraisal of audit findings ( Division 2 , 
Section 7 of KWG). Ongoing monitoring of institutions are to be performed by the Bundesbank's regional offices; 
For more on this, see The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision Monthly Report September 
2000 p 34 .
25  See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 45-46.
26  See for example Buiter ‘Central Banks and Financial Crises’ at page 120.  
27  ibid
28  C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker ' Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies ' (Financial 
Markets Group Special Papers 1992 )140-141; CAE Goodhart The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation 
(1998) 249.
central bank; and that separation would involve wasteful duplication as there is bound to be a lot of 
overlap  between  areas  of  interest  of  and  information  required  by  and  accessible  to  both  the 
supervisor and the central bank. 
Arguments for separation include: Where government financing is required for any large rescue, 
politicians and the Ministry of Finance are likely to be involved. For this reason, it is important for 
the central bank to become more independent in the conduct of monetary policy and less politically 
involved in its supervisory role; that bank failures affect credibility and the central bank requires 
credibility in conducting its monetary policies; and where concerns for the micro-level health and 
stability  of  parts  of  the  banking  system might  affect  the  aim of  the  central  bank’s  conduct  of 
monetary macro-policy – that is, where there is conflict of interest between the combination of 
monetary and regulatory function. 
As a result of its business relationships with credit institutions, its local presence and its general 
proximity to the market, the Bundesbank has deep insights into the financial sector and possesses 
knowledgeable,  qualified  staff  who  deal  with  issues  relating  to  the  financial  market  and  its 
stability.29 It  is  therefore not surprising that  the German Parliament approved the Bundesbank's 
involvement in banking supervision in section 7 of the Banking Act.30 As well as being involved in 
the supervisory process, the Bundesbank is also involved in matters relating to supervisory policy-
making.  As  a  member  of  the  Financial  Markets  Regulatory  Forum,  it  is  acknowledged  as  an 
authority that together with BaFin is responsible for the stability of the financial system.31 
As a result  of  the Bank of England Act 1998,32 the Bank of England has a limited role in the 
regulation and supervision of banks. A review of the extent of the Bank of England’s role in bank 
regulation has achieved partial realisation with the introduction of the 2009 Banking Act.
C. The Need for a Special Resolution Regime 
The Northern Rock crisis highlighted problems which were inherent in the tripartite arrangement 
between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England for dealing with 
financial stability which includes amongst others, the inability of the Bank to act as lender of last 
resort for a limited time without such a role being made public. The consultation paper issued in 
July 2008,33 as a response by the authorities to the Northern Rock Crisis and to strengthen the U.K. 
framework  for  financial  stability,  envisaged  a  leading  role  for  the  Bank  of  England  in  the 
implementation of a special resolution regime for banks.34
The establishment of a “special resolution regime” which should enable the seizure of a failing bank 
and facilitate all or part of its business to be transferred to a “bridge bank” which would manage 
services for customers, is also a consequence of the Northern Rock crisis. 
The Banking Act 2009 received Royal Assent on the 12 February 2009 – legislation having been 
29  Deutsche Bundesbank,  „Bundesbank and German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)“ 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php >
30 ibid
31  ibid
32  Whereby powers related to the supervision and regulation of banks were transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority. 
33  HM Treasury, Bank of England and FSA, 2008, “Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Further 
Consultation,” July 2008.   
34  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at page 21.
introduced into Parliament on the 7 October 2008.35 As well as formalising the role of the Bank of 
England in its  oversight of systemically vital  payment systems, the Banking Act 2009 has also 
resulted in statutory powers being granted to the Bank of England, in respect of its responsibility for 
financial stability.36 The Act is divided into eight sections which deal with the special resolution 
regime,  bank  insolvency,  bank  administration  procedures,  inter  bank  payment  systems  and  the 
Financial Compensation Scheme. 
The special resolution regime, which constitutes the focal point, in respect of measures aimed at 
dealing with failing banks, is the new statutory and permanent regime which consolidates temporary 
measures  introduced  by  the  Banking  (Special  Provisions)  Act  2008  (BSPA)37 which  was 
implemented as a means of exercising control and bringing Northern Rock into temporary public 
ownership in February 2008. According to Part 138, section 1 (1) of the Act, the purpose of the 
special resolution regime for banks is to address the situation where all or part of the business of a 
bank has encountered, or is likely to encounter financial difficulties. The special resolution regime 
consists  of   three  stabilisation  options,39 the  bank  insolvency  procedures40 and  the  bank 
administration procedures.41
The FSA is the triggering authority. The trigger is pulled “… once the FSA considers the bank is 
‘failing or likely to fail to meet its threshold condition’ and ‘due to the circumstances the bank is not 
reasonably likely to turn its fortunes around so that it meets its threshold conditions’.”42
35  See HM Treasury, „Banking Act 2009“ <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_banking_act2009.htm> 
36  Regulatory and supervisory responsibilities had been formally passed to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
under the Bank of England Act 1998.
37  „What the BSPA provided for  was inter  alia,  a  ready means for  the Tripartite  Authorities  (Treasury,  Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority, FSA) to transfer “the ownership or business of UK authorised deposit 
takers … either into public ownership, or to another body in the private sector”.
Temporarily taking a (deemed) failing British bank into public ownership involved a transfer of an institution’s 
assets and liabilities and property rights, in whole or in part, for the time being to a ‘bridge bank’, being a wholly 
owned subsidiary which the Bank of  England established for  this purpose.  This  transfer  was not  envisaged as 
nationalisation per se, but rather an exercise in control even if, while in State hands (in the interim ownership of the 
bridge bank), the authorities might resolve to choose from two options (‘resolution tools’ as the options have been 
described) provided for from the point of view of the public interest in confidence in banking; its systemic stability; 
and minimising the cost to the taxpayer of crisis management.“ See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking 
Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at page 39.
38 „ Part 1 (stabilisation) provides for a capacity on the part of the authorities, acting according to law effectively to 
seize the balance sheets (with ‘securities’ and ‘property’ separately distinguished), in whole or in part, of a failing 
financial institution deemed essential to the systemic stability of the financial system. The language of the Act is not 
one of ‘seizure’, but rather ‘transfer’. The outcome is (temporary) public ownership. The initiative lies with the state 
authorities (FSA trigger). There is no right of appeal (e.g. to the courts) that lies with the involuntary transferor.“ see 
ibid at page 42.
39  See section 2 of the Act ; See also section 1 (3a-c) : These are a) transfer to a private sector purchaser b) transfer to a 
bridge bank, and c) transfer to temporary public ownership. Further, „the Act provides that three stabilisation tools 
are available to the authorities in respect of the securities and property (business) transferred or taken over. They 
may be sold on to a third party (P&A). They may be transferred to a bridge bank (see section 3.4 below) wholly 
owned by the Bank of England. Or, they may be put into temporary public ownership (TPO) in a Treasury owned, 
specially  created  banking  entity.  The  toolkit  is  both  calibrated  and  represents  a  ranking  of  preferences  of  the 
authorities, from a preferred sale post transfer to TPO (last resort).  See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking 
Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at pages 42 and 43.
40  As stated under Part 2.
41  As provided under Part 3.
42  See F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at page 42 
and  also  D  Singh,  The  UK Banking  Act  2009,  Bank  Resolution  and  Early  Intervention:  Policy  and  Practice, 
PowerPoint presentation, Symposium on Managing Systemic Risk, 7 – 9 April 2010, University of Warwick.
The  Act  not  only  consolidates  the  tripartite  arrangement  as  established  under  the  2006 
Memorandum of Understanding, but is also evidential of the extension of the Bank of England’s 
role in the supervisory process.43 This is reflected in sections such as those of 7 and 8 of the Act, 
which clarify responsibilities in relation to the exercise of powers. In respect of bank insolvency 
procedures, an insolvency order may be made only on the application of the FSA with the consent 
of the Bank of England, or on the application of the Bank of England.44 Further, before exercising 
insolvency powers in respect of a residual bank, the FSA is required to give notice to the Bank of 
England.45 
Germany  is  one  of  the  most  recent  countries  at  this  point  in  time,  to  legislate  for  a  special 
framework within which to resolve banks that fall into difficulty – such a vehicle being provided by 
the Bank Restructuring Act or the Restrukturierungsgesetz (Restructuring Act).46
Three phases to the regime, as identified, are as follows:47
1. Restructuring (Sanierungsverfahren);
2. Reorganisation (Reorganisationsverfahren); and
3. Transfer (to bridge bank) (Übertragungsanordnung).
The rationale for such initiative  having been outlined by the Finance Ministry:48
New rules are urgently required. The existing insolvency legislation and supervisory instruments are intended to freeze 
a company’s operations. But doing so can negatively affect other financialmarket participants and the financial system 
as a whole. In the short term, state support measures, such as those brought in since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, 
can limit the damage to financial markets.However, the government’s ability to manage a crisis will remain limited as 
long as there is no mechanism for an orderly restructuring or resolution process. At the same time, if banks are certain 
the state will rush to the rescue in an emergency, this diminishes their sense of responsibility in the business decisions 
they take and creates an incentive to take on an uncontrollable level of risk. The government must not be left to pay for 
this with taxpayers’ money.“
Despite the above mentioned reforms, some gaps which persist across several jurisdictions, and 
indeed across the globe, have been highlighted by the Basel Committee in its recent report and are 
as follows:49
43  Financial Services Authority, „ Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority“ < http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_hmt_boe.pdf> 
44  See section 117(2) of the Act. 
45  See section 157 of the Act.  
46  „The legislation was first  mooted on 31 March 2010, when the government advanced a set  of proposals in a 
discussion paper (the ‘key issues’ paper).  A bill  was introduced to Parliament on 25 August  2010, passed with 
amendments in 28 October 2010 by the lower house and on 26 November by the upper house. The Act came into 
effect on 1 January 2011.“ See F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ 
February 2011 at page 53.
47 „A comprehensive scheme which extends to prudential supervisory and regulatory reforms to provide for Prompt 
corrective Action (PCA) as well as for a crisis and resolution management regime (SRR) for SIFIs.“; ibid. 
48  See ibid 
49  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress So Far, July 2011, 
BIS Publications, particularly at pages 2 and 3 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf>
− The fact that many countries continue to lack important legal powers to resolve a financial 
institution in distress.50
− Authorities  in  many countries  appear  to  lack  the  legal  powers  to  temporarily delay the 
operation  of  early  termination  provisions  in  financial  contracts  in  order  to  complete  a 
transfer of these contracts to a sound financial institution, a bridge financial institution or 
other public entity.51
− Shortcomings which continue to persist with respect to the resolution of a financial group, 
especially in a cross-border context.
− The fact that newly introduced tools or tools under consideration to deal with SIFIs, which 
include bridge bank powers or bail-in, are untested in many jurisdictions, or untested in their 
application to a complex multi-entity cross-border group or conglomerate.
− The uncertainty which remains in respect of the availability of temporary funding to support 
resolution measures. 
− Significant  differences  which  exist  among  the  various  deposit  protection  arrangements, 
which could complicate cross-border resolutions.
D. Central Bank Independence 
Central bank independence is considered as a means of achieving the goal of price stability.52 It is 
also interesting to note that Lastra recommends the inclusion of regulatory powers in any law which 
truly safeguards independence.53 This would infer that central bank independence would be ensured 
if the central bank was responsible for both monetary policy setting and regulatory functions – 
hence price stability would be better  facilitated through a  central  bank whose powers not only 
consisted of monetary policy setting functions, but also of regulatory and supervisory functions. 
The strong record held by the Deutsche Bundesbank and in particular, the pre-1999 Bundesbank in 
maintaining price stability is reiterated.54 However, the difficulty in finding a central bank whose 
independence is absolute is also highlighted.55 In as much as certain events and developments make 
it  difficult  to  ensure  that  a  central  bank's  independence  is  absolute,  developments  such  as 
50   „...And that where some powers are available, the lack of certain essential powers, including powers to terminate 
unnecessary contracts, continue needed contracts, sell assets and transfer liabilities, will risk making the resolution 
of the financial institution’s affairs difficult and costly. The BCBS Recommendations identified these legal powers 
as typically useful to enhance the ability of resolution authorities to continue systemically important financial 
functions while conducting an orderly resolution or liquidation of the individual financial firm. While some progress 
has been made, much remains to be done. „ see ibid at paragraph 6 page 2.
51  „Even if these powers exist, it is not clear if they will be recognised where financial contracts are governed by 
foreign laws.“
52  See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 45-46.  
53  ibid at page 46. 
54  ibid at pages 51-61. 
55  „The Bundesbank's scope for independence has been restricted as a result of two major developments namely: The 
German unification and the European Monetary Union. In  the case of German unification, the issue concerned 
national  identity,  not  price  stability.  The  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  of  the  European  Monetary  System  was 
sacrificed in order to achieve the greater national objective of unifying the German people. With regards to the 
European Monetary Union, supranational integration was held to be more important for the future of the German 
nation than the maintenance of an independent central bank.“ For further information on this, see ibid at 58-61. 
Lastra highlights the fact that the independence of the Bundesbank has seldom been sacrificed on the basis that the 
economy was suffering.  
conglomeration and globalisation have warranted the need for the involvement of a single regulator. 
However, this is a function which if not absolutely carried out by the central bank, should still, to a 
great extent, involve the central bank. 
There  appears  to  be  greater  support  for  central  bank  independence  when  compared  with 
independence granted to supervisory and regulatory agencies. Even though there is and there has 
been support  for central  bank independence – particularly with reference to independence from 
political interference, there is still some reluctance to grant independence to financial regulators and 
supervisors.56 According to Hüpkes and others, it is more difficult for financial regulators to design 
accountability arrangements than it is for central banks.57 In their opinion, the reluctance by policy 
makers to grant independence to supervisory and regulatory agencies is attributed to three factors.58 
The significance of central bank financial independence as a component of overall independence 
has been emphasised by the European Union.59 According to Buiter,60 two types of central bank 
independence exist,  namely,  target independence and operational  independence.  Four aspects  of 
central bank independence are considered by Smaghi namely:61 functional, institutional, personal 
and  financial  independence.  For  the  purposes  of  the  discussion  in  this  paper,  operational  and 
financial independence will constitute the focus of discussion. 
Central Bank Financial Independence 
Financial independence involves the independence of the central bank - when considered from the 
perspective of the funding of its activities and the exercise of its powers.62 In Amtenbrink’s view, 
the central bank’s legal basis may facilitate a system whereby a government which has been elected 
democratically determines the boundaries within which the central bank should decide on an actual 
capital  increase.63 However,  the  success  of  such  an  arrangement  would  be  dependent  on  the 
existence of a key factor, namely, the bank’s independence from the government at the time when 
the  actual  need  for  re  capitalisation  occurs.64 Furthermore,  central  bank financial  independence 
would be safeguarded where the central bank is not dependent on the government’s general budget 
but is able to address the needs of its financial operations through its own generated income.65 
According  to  Smaghi,66 legal  provisions  alone  are  generally  not  adequate  to  guarantee  the 
appropriate level of central bank independence – the respect for independence and its boundaries, 
56  See EHG Hüpkes, M Quintyn, M Taylor, ‘The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Theory and Practice 
2006 at page 1. 
57  ibid, preface.  
58  ibid at page 1; The three factors include: Firstly, the fact that independent regulatory and supervisory agencies could 
become another branch of government which is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as that which is prescribed 
to the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Secondly, without adequate regulatory oversight, regulators may 
favor industry interests over those of the public – hence facilitating the possibility of a “regulatory capture” 
occurring. Thirdly, self interest may contribute to policy makers’ reluctance to giving up their oversight functions.  
59  See P Stella and A Lönnberg, ‚Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’ IMF Working Paper WP/08/37 
and in particular, the European Monetary Institute’s report EMI (1998) “Convergence report” at page 295.  
60  See W Buiter, ‘What’s Left of Central Bank Independence?’ < http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-left-of-
central-bank-independence/> 
61  See LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, July 2008.  
62  See R Smits, ‘European Central bank Institutional Aspects’ 1997 Kluwer Law International at page 157.  
63  F Amtenbrink, ‘Securing Financial Independence in the Legal Basis of a Central Bank’ at page 6.  
64  ibid
65  ibid
66  See LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, July 2008, p. 446. 
amongst parties  involved, also being an important factor . He considers four elements of central 
bank  independence,  namely,  functional,  institutional,  personal  and  financial  independence.67 
Furthermore, he goes on to state that: 
“The  concept  of  financial  independence  should  therefore  be  assessed  from the  perspective  of 
whether any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over the tasks 
of a central bank but also over its ability (understood both operationally, in terms of manpower, and 
financially, in terms of appropriate financial resources) to fulfil its mandate.”68 
Ensuring  absolute  independence  with  central  bank  financial  independence  also  constitutes  a 
difficult task. This is illustrated by the close links which exist between the central bank and the 
Treasury in many countries.  Is  it  possible  for a  central  bank to  operate  effectively -  given the 
presence  of  absolute  independence?  The  importance  of  close  collaboration  and  exchange  of 
information between the tripartite authorities in the UK (the FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of 
England) was highlighted by the Northern Rock Crisis. These, if effective as they should have been, 
could have helped, not only in identifying the problems which existed at Northern Rock,69 but to 
facilitate timely intervention which would have averted the scale of the crisis. 
Operational independence 
This is defined as “…the freedom or ability of a central bank to pursue its objectives (regardless of 
who sets them) as it sees fit, without interference or pressure from third parties.”70 In order for such 
independence to be effective, it is also argued that freedom from political influences is vital.71 As is 
the case with financial independence, absolute independence is extremely rare given the fact that 
the central bank, in many jurisdictions, is connected in one way or the other to the State and the 
sovereign. Illustrating with the scenario which exists in the UK, the central bank is owned by the 
Treasury72 and several checks, for example, the role of the Treasury in underwriting risk attending 
emergency lending,  are vital  to ensuring accountability in matters  relating to the central  bank’s 
position.73 Furthermore, regional and global developments are factors which may contribute to the 
status  of  independence  attained  by  a  central  bank.  For  instance,  the  Bundesbank's  scope  for 
independence  has  been  restricted  as  a  result  of  two major  developments  namely:  The  German 
unification and the European Monetary Union.74
67  ibid
68  Ibid at 452.
69  It should be added that a lot of factors contributed to Northern Rock’s collapse – amongst which are the 
inadequacies of the measurements under Basel 2 and issues related to liquidity.  
70  See W Buiter, ‘What’s Left of Central Bank Independence?’ < http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-left-of-
central-bank-independence/> 
71  ibid
72  W Buiter Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” at page 40. 
73  See P Stella and A Lönnberg, ‘Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’ IMF Working Paper WP/08/37.
74  See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability Oxford University Press 2006 at page 58.  
Arguments For and Against Central Bank Independence 
Arguments In Favour 
Need to ensure that central bank can act freely in pursuit of its objectives without interference from 
political pressures or other third parties. 
Where  operational  independence  exists,  excessive  interest  rate  cuts  resulting  from  political 
pressures could be avoided.75 However, excessive interest rates cuts may not be consequential of 
political pressures as they may arise through the application of the precautionary principle. 
Other factors which may contribute to excessive interest rate cuts include extreme sensitivity to 
matters relating to the financial sector (which indicate “cognitive regulatory capture”) and failures 
by strategic members of the FOMC to comprehend adequately the way in which the interest rate 
mechanism should operate (hence an inappropriate application of the mechanism).76 At times of 
high uncertainty, appropriate application of the interest rate mechanism as a tool of monetary policy 
should be timely, decisive and flexible and should focus on the principal risk.77 
Arguments against 
This could lead to abuse of powers. The level of independence granted should correspondingly be 
justified by sufficient checks and balances. 
Regulatory capture: Bank collapses such as BCCI and Barings raised concerns regarding the ability 
of the Bank of England , as supervisor to separate itself adequately from the culture of the banking 
industry in order to enable it function as a truly independent supervisor and regulator.78 Due to lack 
of transparency, the kind of regime under which the Bank of England operated then, as regulator, a 
regime of informal and negotiated enforcement, was prone to two forms of abuse.79 Firstly, it could 
degenerate into the capture of the regulatory system by the regulated, and secondly, it could conceal 
selective enforcement and possible harsh treatment of less significant regulatees.80 
Close collaboration with other authorities may be vital to ensuring that complete, adequate and 
timely information relating to systemically relevant individual institutions is obtained. 
Provided adequate balances and checks are in place to guard against any abuse that could result 
from a grant of independence,  impediment to close collaboration between regulatory authorities 
should be overcome. Furthermore, adequate mechanisms of accountability should help to avoid a 
situation whereby regulatory capture could occur. 
75  W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” at page 113.  
76  ibid at pages 113,114.  
77  See ibid pages 53 and 54; For further information on optimal decision making under uncertainty and whether 
regulator’s focus should be directed at extreme risks, also see ibid at page 54.  
78  See Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Sixth Report: “The Regulation of Financial Services in the UK” House 
of Commons, (1994-1995) 332 para 108.  
79  C Hadjiemanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England 1995 Lloyds of London Press at page 182.  
80  ibid
Having  highlighted  the  fundamental  role  contributed  by  central  banks  to  the  regulatory  and 
supervisory  process  and  the  importance  of  central  bank  independence,  measures  aimed  at 
safeguarding an extension of such powers should be in place. 
E. Measures Adopted in the Aftermath of the Recent Crises 
Following the introduction of the 2009 Banking Act in the UK,81 the following measures which are 
aimed at ensuring greater independent accountability, have been adopted correspondingly with an 
extension of the Bank of England’s powers in regulation: 
1) A new Financial Stability Committee (FSC), which is a product of the Act and which is a 
sub committee of the Court of Directors.82 It comprises of the Governor of the Bank, deputy 
governors  and  four  non  executive  directors  appointed  by the  chair  of  the  Court.83 The 
functions of the Committee as stipulated in the Act are:84
 To make recommendations to the Court of Directors, which they shall consider, about the nature 
and implementation of the Bank’s strategy in relation to the Financial Stability Objective; to give 
advice about whether and how the Bank should act in respect of an institution, where the issue 
appears to the Committee to be relevant to the Financial Stability Objective; in particular, to give 
advice about whether and how the Bank should use stabilisation powers under Part 1 of the Banking 
Act 2009 in particular cases; to monitor the Bank’s use of the stabilisation powers; to monitor the 
Bank’s exercise of its functions under Part 5 of the Banking Act 2009 (inter-bank payment systems), 
and any other functions delegated to the Committee by the Court of Directors for the purpose of 
pursuing the Financial Stability Objective. 
2)  Efforts are being undertaken to facilitate the Bank’s access to supervisory information with 
the Treasury indicating that the Bank will be able to make recommendations to the FSA in 
respect of its framework for regulation and supervision.85
 
3) The Turner Review which not only elaborates on ways in which responsibilities of a macro 
prudential nature could be allocated between the Bank and the FSA, but also on how this 
could be implemented.86
In  Germany,  the  perception  that  the  allocation  of  responsibilities  between the  Bundesbank  and 
BaFin  had  lacked  clarity  and  transparency  resulted  in  the  issue  of  a  new  Memorandum  of 
Understanding in February 2008.87 This followed a series of government bailouts of state owned 
banks in 2008 – which in part, was attributed to the systemic importance assumed by such banks 
81  „The framework provided for by the Banking Act 2009 has been further developed in one important respect : living 
wills. The Financial Services Act 2010 (FSA/10) provides at section 7, for a duty on the FSA to require authorised 
firms to prepare and maintain ‘living wills’,  or as they are formally referred to,  recovery and resolution plans 
(RRPs). Section 7 in fact, is a detailed series of amendments to section 139 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000.“ See F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at 
page 44. 
82  See Bank of England, „News Release, Financial Stability Committee“ < 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/048.htm> 
83  ibid
84  ibid
85  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 page 21. 
86   ibid
87  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22.  
and the potential disastrous consequences which could occur if  they had been allowed to fail.88 
Close links exist between member banks of the German Savings Banks Finance Group (Sparkassen-
Finanzgruppe) and as long as they are in the position to do so, they are required to bail each other 
out. The problem which existed at the time resulted from the fact that many of these banks were 
facing financial difficulties – hence were not in the position to assist other member banks.89 
The crisis faced by IKB, Landesbanken and Hypo Real Estates not only revealed an absence of a 
special resolution regime for banks, but also raised the issue of optimal measures which could be 
implemented  to  control  (in  part)  privately  owned,  but  publicly-sponsored  or  (in  part)  publicly 
owned financial enterprises.90
Counter cyclical instruments 
As well as a consideration of the Special Resolution Regime and central bank independence, the 
need to adopt counter cyclical instruments has been brought to the fore as a result of the flaws 
inherent in Basel 2. According to Goodhart,91 “Central banks cannot achieve price and financial 
stability with one instrument  (interest  rates).  A counter-cyclical  regulatory system is  needed to 
dampen asset booms and to smooth busting bubbles”. Problems resulting from a reliance on the 
interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy were revealed through the failure of the ECB and 
the  Bank  of  England  to  implement  such  an  instrument  to  organise  a  “substantially  globally 
coordinated interest rate cut in 2008“.92
Counter cyclical instruments such as the Spanish pre-provisioning measures and the use of time 
varying loan to value (LTV) ratios have been identified as the only counter cyclical instruments 
which currently operate.93 Goodhart highlights the fact that accounting standards such as those of 
the IFRS and the IASB have impeded the potential of the Spanish pre provisioning measures.94 
Furthermore,  criticisms  in  introducing  counter  cyclical  variations  in  LTVs  or  capital/liquidity 
requirements have also been highlighted.95
Conclusion 
Given these considerations, it could be deduced that preventive measures such as those of interest 
rate facilities and counter cyclical  measures should not be relied on, in their entirety.  For legal 
provisions to function effectively, safeguards aimed at ensuring central bank independence are not 
88  W Reuter, Spiegel Online ,“Worst Financial Crisis Since 1931?“ 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,536635,00.html>  
89  ibid
90  W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at page 22. 
91  CAE Goodhart., “Central Banks’ Function to Maintain Financial Stability: An Uncompleted Task,” VoxEU.org 
(June 24, 2008), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1263.  
92  The 8 October 2008 cut was considered to be extremely inadequate, See J Muellbauer, ‘The Folly of the Central 
Banks of Europe’ October 2008 <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2488> 
93  See CAE Goodhart, “Central Banks’ Function to Maintain Financial Stability: An Uncompleted Task,” VoxEU.org 
(June 24, 2008), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1263.  
94  ibid
95  ibid
only necessary, respect for such safeguards is required. As highlighted in the introduction, adequate 
balance  will  have  to  be struck  by ensuring that  accountability  mechanisms,  whilst  not  placing 
regulators in a position where they become prone to “capture”, are also implemented and applied to 
facilitate  the  necessary  level  of  information  interchange  between  the  regulator  and  regulated 
institutions. The need for remedial measures such as that of the special resolution regime become all 
the more important. Whilst it is evident that necessary action should be undertaken to prevent a 
scenario  where  remedial  measures  should  be  implemented,  it  is  also  necessary  to  have 
precautionary measures. 
According to Paramo,96 a line should be drawn between both (what the central bank can and 
cannot do) “..in terms of the goals  that specific measures are designed to achieve (which 
should be compatible with the mandate of the central bank) and in terms of the level of risk 
taken (which should be compatible with the ability of the central bank to absorb risk without 
jeopardising its financial independence)”. 
Central  banks  have  vital  roles  to  play  in  the  maintenance  of  price  stability,  achieving  and 
maintaning  stability  within  the  financial  system,  and the  provision  of  liquidity.  As  well  as  the 
possibility of the central bank assuming roles as catalysts for private rescue measures, a coupling 
between extraordinary liquidity measures and non standard monetary policy measures has been 
recommended.97 
 
96  J González-Páramo, ‘Managing Risk: The Role of the Central Bank in a Financial Crisis’ Speech Given at Risk 
Europe 2009 Frankfurt am Main, 4 June 2009 <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090604.en.html>  
97  ibid
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